Urban vulnerability, disaster risk reduction and resettlement in Mzuzu city, Malawi by Kita, Stern Mwakalimi
Author’s Accepted Manuscript
Urban vulnerability, disaster risk reduction and
resettlement in Mzuzu city, Malawi
Stern Mwakalimi Kita
PII: S2212-4209(16)30671-9
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.03.010
Reference: IJDRR527
To appear in: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction
Received date: 2 November 2016
Revised date: 26 March 2017
Accepted date: 26 March 2017
Cite this article as: Stern Mwakalimi Kita, Urban vulnerability, disaster risk
reduction and resettlement in Mzuzu city, Malawi, International Journal of
Disaster Risk Reduction, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.03.010
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for
publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of
the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and
review of the resulting galley proof before it is published in its final citable form.
Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which
could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdr
 Urban vulnerability, disaster risk reduction and resettlement in 
Mzuzu city, Malawi 
Stern Mwakalimi Kita
1,2,*
 
1
PhD Candidate, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, United Kingdom. 
2
 Chief Mitigation Officer, Department of Disaster Management Affairs, Malawi. 
stenkita@gmail.com 
s.kita@sussex.ac.uk 
*Correspondence addresses: University of Sussex, School of Global Studies, Geography, Arts Building 
C, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9SJ, UK. Mobile Phone: +447448781729/+265999430940 
 
Abstract 
For most developing countries at risk of disasters and climate change, adopting structural 
measures to reduce disaster risks remain a challenge. This paper presents findings of a study 
conducted through a mixed methods design in a flood risk city in Malawi, Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The study assesses the city’s vulnerability to floods and actions being taken to reduce 
the risks. It then investigates how resettlement is being promoted as one such risk reduction 
measure. The study finds multiple vulnerability factors, including unsafe construction 
practices, poor drainage systems, unregulated solid waste disposal, institutional incapacity, 
inadequacy of land, settlements in high risk areas, deforestation, siltation of rivers and 
national disaster risk reduction policies that neglect urban areas. However, efforts to tackle 
underlying causes of vulnerability are wanting. One positive programme is a slum upgrading 
pilot project implemented by non-state actors that also lacks government support. In the case 
of resettlement, its planning and execution is fraught with multiple challenges emanating 
from haphazard planning and lack of community participation. The paper argues that the 
emphasis on resettlement is obscuring the key drivers of vulnerability, while simultaneously 
exposing both resettled and those left behind to further risks. It, therefore, calls for caution 
when planning and implementing disaster risk reduction policies that have the potential to 
create new forms of vulnerability to hazards or exacerbate them.  
 
Abbreviations 
CEO, Chief executive officer; DRM, disaster risk management; IHS3, Third integrated 
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1.0 Introduction 
Prohibitive land markets and high levels of poverty force large numbers of rural-urban 
migrants to occupy informal settlements, which are often the only places they can afford 
(Miles et al., 2012; Isunju et al., 2016). Most informal settlements are located in areas prone 
to multiple hazards, often in land that is ignored by the rich because of its susceptibility to 
disasters such as floods, earthquakes, landslides and fire (Tipple, 2006; Bull-Kamanga et al., 
2003; Moser, et al., 2010; Baker, 2012; Usamah et al., 2013; Castro et al., 2015). 
Vulnerability of most urban poor to natural disasters is, therefore, attached to the places they 
occupy: those with adequate resources are able to acquire better land that is safer from 
hazards. People living in informal settlements tend to occupy sub-standard houses that are 
close to one another and that disturb natural drainage systems and waterways (Wisner et al., 
2004; Tanner et al., 2009). 
 A number of additional factors have been identified as major drivers of risk in cities 
and other urban areas. Population concentration, developmental densities, unplanned 
urbanisation and regulatory shortfalls all put urban areas at great risk (Wisner et al., 2004; 
Wamsler et. al., 2013; Johnson and Blackburn, 2014; Malalgoda, 2014). Some of these can be 
manifested through physical aspects such as the informal nature and type of construction 
prevalent in urban areas. In addition, the social facet can be affected where communal 
networks and kinships that are strong in rural areas can become weaker (Sharma et. al., 
2015). Lack of authority and well-qualified personnel to enforce regulations in urban areas 
also contribute to hazards vulnerability through unsafe settlement and construction practices 
(Green, 2008). Surjan and colleagues (2015) add that failure to ensure proper construction in 
cities is due to prevalence of an informal untrained construction sector and limited awareness 
by the citizenry on building bylaws. A number of DRR measures are being promoted in urban 
areas, including population resettlement from high risk areas (Correa, 2011; Chen et al., 
2017; Arnall, 2013; Ferris, 2011, 2012).  
 The aim of this study was to investigate the level of vulnerability to flood risk and 
how resettlement is being used to reduce flood risk in Mzuzu city, Malawi. In April 2016, the 
city of Mzuzu experienced the worst floods ever recorded since its establishment. 15 
settlements were affected, 19,000 people were displaced, seven people died and seven camps 
were set up to accommodate the displaced. The flood effects were mostly felt in informal 
settlements. Following the disaster, the city decided to implement a resettlement programme 
as a long-term risk reduction measure targeting some of those whose houses had collapsed or 
were badly damaged. While previous empirical studies have tended to focus on resettlement 
processes that have already been completed, mostly within rural settings, this study 
contributes to the literature by primarily presenting the intricacies that go into the planning of 
a resettlement scheme within an urban setting in a low-income country. 
To achieve this, the study asks: What are the key vulnerability factors to flood risks in 
the city? To what extent is urban DRR considered a priority by the city and the national DRM 
architecture? How and why is resettlement used as a risk reduction measure in the city? What 
other DRR strategies are being used and how effective are they? The rest of the paper is 
organised into five key sections: the first section introduces the study’s analytical framework 
before reviewing the literature on urban risk and resettlement. This is followed by the 
methodology section. The third section presents the study’s results and then discusses these 
findings in the fourth section. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
1.1 Analytical framework 
The study adopts an analytical framework based on the pressure and release (PAR) model in 
understanding the broader vulnerability factors to floods and related risk reduction efforts. 
The PAR model was initially developed by Blaike et al. (1994) and revised by Wisner et al. 
(2004) and has since been widely used in disaster risk reduction studies (e.g. Asgary and 
Halim, 2011; Manyena, 2012; Nirupama, 2012; Arnall, 2015; Islam and Lim, 2015; Oliver-
Smith, 2016). Central to the model is its demonstration that disasters do not simply result 
from hazards, but occur when a hazard meets a vulnerable population, creating some kind of 
pressure. Reducing disaster risks, therefore, requires releasing the pressure, which demands 
consideration of both the hazard and vulnerability. The relevance of the model to this study is 
twofold. As argued by Manyena (2012), the utility of the PAR model lies in providing a 
framework that can be used to analyse the hazard and vulnerability context contributing to 
disaster occurrence. In addition, the model can assist in understanding whether the measures 
being adopted are actually reducing disaster risks or not. 
According to Wisner et al. (2004) and Adger (2006), vulnerability to disasters has 
multiple and interconnected causes, which can be physical, social, economic, political or 
environmental. The PAR model posits that vulnerability is embedded within the social 
structure and progresses from root or underlying causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe 
conditions. Root causes can include climate change, lack of regulations to control unsafe 
practices, failure by government to enforce its regulations, gender relations and limited access 
to resources. Dynamic pressures result from the root causes and can be structures or 
processes such as social networks, lack of local institutions, rapid urbanisation, deforestation, 
leadership and governance systems or religion. Unsafe conditions are linked to dynamic 
pressures and include location in high risk areas, residing in unsafe buildings and low 
income. 
 
1.2 Urban vulnerability and disaster risk reduction 
A city’s vulnerability to disaster risk is multi-faceted. Addressing urban risks requires 
looking at the various core components and functions of a city that can be at the centre of 
vulnerability, including urban planning, public service delivery, disaster risk management 
(DRM), governance, safety and crime (Wamsler et al., 2013; Surjan et al., 2015).  Since these 
often fall under different departments within a city, coordination among players working 
within the different sectors is crucial. It also implies that dealing with urban risks requires 
presence of professionals not just in city planning or governance but also in disaster risk 
reduction, climate change adaptation and related areas. These would spearhead and 
coordinate resilience building efforts. Their absence tend to push disaster risk reduction or 
climate adaptation to the periphery: unlike DRM specialists, urban planners and managers 
tend to concentrate more on routine risks (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003).  
The complexity and interactions of urban systems also make it difficult to isolate 
specific impacts to sectors that climate change and climate variability would have, which 
calls for holistic risk reduction approaches that are not only multi-faceted but also synergistic 
(Carter et al., 2015). Scholars have argued that addressing disaster risks requires a 
comprehensive approach that looks at all risk influencing factors from a developmental 
perspective, which are hazards, vulnerability and weaknesses in response and recovery 
systems (Wisner et al., 2004; Adger, 2006; Manyena, 2012; Wamsler et al., 2013; Islam and 
Lim, 2015). Reduction of urban vulnerability to disaster risks is, therefore, not just about 
building stronger structures, but involves the whole city fabric (Godschalk, 2003). Johnson 
and Blackburn (2014) have identified four common activities that are critical to ensuring 
urban resilience to disasters such as floods: setting up urban institutional structures 
responsible for disaster risk reduction, integrating disaster risk reduction into urban planning 
regulations, building physical flood mitigation structures and enhancing awareness, education 
and training programmes. In addition, presence of proper drainage systems, strong emergency 
response systems, well designed buildings and strong regulatory and enforcement systems are 
important elements of urban resilience (Desouza and Flanery, 2013).  
 
1.3 Resettlement as disaster risk reduction  
Where people have settled in high risk areas such as wetlands, resettlement from such 
places could be a means to reduce disaster risks (Correa, 2011). In most cases, resettlement is 
voluntary and assisted, involving a number of stakeholders and incentive mechanisms (de 
Sherbinin et. al., 2011). For an involuntary resettlement process to succeed, some people 
ought to volunteer to participate (Hammond, 2008).  
The literature on resettlement shows variations in resettlement adoption and success, 
with a preponderance of failures. While resettlement can provide opportunities for affected 
households to improve their livelihoods (Oliver-Smith and de Sherbinin, 2014), it has often 
been found that households face numerous challenges as they reconstruct their livelihoods 
following resettlement (Arnall, 2013; Chen et al., 2017; Mavhura  et al., 2017). A number of 
factors in the design, construction, implementation and delivery of resettlement programmes 
contribute to its success or failure. Studies have shown that the willingness to resettle and 
resettlement success increases with the amount of compensation, settlement destination, level 
of participation by those being resettled and size of land offered to households (Carmona and 
Correa, 2011; Correa et al., 2011; Arnall, 2013; Artur and Hilhorst, 2014; Vlaeminck et al., 
2016; Chen et al., 2017). Long-term sustainability of resettled communities require, among 
others; productive livelihoods, building community cohesion, provision of opportunities for 
employment and easy access to infrastructure and social services (Keraminiyage & 
Piyatadsananon, 2013; Usamah & Hyaden, 2012).  
Michael Cernea (1997, 2000) argues that resettlement should be properly planned and 
implemented as experience has shown that if not planned and implemented well, the 
consequences on those displaced are devastating. His impoverishment risks and 
reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations posit that poorly planned 
resettlement can lead to landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, increased 
morbidity, food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources and social or 
community disarticulation. It has, therefore, been argued by scholars and practitioners that 
resettlement should be considered as a measure of the last resort (Ferris, 2011, 2012; Oliver-
Smith and de Sherbinin, 2014).  
Where resettlement is nevertheless considered as an option for disaster risk reduction 
or climate change adaptation, it should be accompanied by appropriate policy changes to curb 
return to the risky areas (Correa et al., 2011). Regulating the reclaimed land is crucial as 
evidence shows that without proper regulation, people will return and occupy the same areas 
(Bowman and Henquinet, 2015). This, therefore, calls for proper planning, rehabilitation and 
management of the land that has been reclaimed, with necessary monitoring mechanisms in 
place. Carmona and Correa (2011) cite examples of policy options used in Latin America, 
which included: development of regulations banning settlements in risky areas in Argentine, 
Colombia and Guatemala; prohibition of investments in risky areas in Guatemala, and; 
turning the land into public investments such as public green zones in Argentina, ecological 
park in Colombia and stream canalisation and road projects in Brazil. Evidence further 
suggests that the choice of policy options should be carefully selected and contextualised as 
some may have little effect. In Mozambique, for instance, government prohibited the 
provision of social services in the reclaimed area to discourage reoccupation after 
resettlement. However, some people who had voluntarily relocated still returned to the areas 
(Artur and Hilhorst, 2014). 
 
2.0 Methodology and study location 
 
2.1 Study site 
Mzuzu city is located in the northern part of Malawi, sub-Saharan Africa. It lies on the 
border between Mzimba and Nkhatabay districts and covers an area of 143.8 km
2
. It is 
divided into 15 administrative wards and its 2017 population was estimated at 254,891 (NSO, 
2008).  It was established in the 1940s as a centre for tung production by the colonial 
government. In mid-1950s, the global price for tung oil slumped, which led to production 
cuts at the estate. Consequently, a number of buildings and other structures  became obsolete 
and were offered to government. This led to the establishment of a regional administrative 
centre for the north (Haskard, 2005; Williams, 1969). In 1980, Mzuzu became a municipality 
and five years later it became the third city in Malawi. More than 60 percent of the population 
in the city live in informal settlements (UN-HABITAT, 2011).  
Mzuzu receives around 1,200 mm of rainfall annually and has experienced flash floods 
almost every year over the past decade, with the most serious flooding events recorded in 
1991 and 2016. Inter-annual rainfall variability over the city is very common (fig. 1), though 
no statistically significant trend can be observed over the period 1971 to 2015. Combination 
of hilly and low-lying areas in the city provide multiple risks. 75 percent of the available land 
in the city is customary land, with only 15 percent being public (UN-HABITAT, 2011).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual rainfall variability for Mzuzu city, Malawi, 1971-2015  
 
Masasa and Mchengautuwa wards (fig. 2) were selected as sites for focus groups, semi-
structured interviews and observation because they had the largest number of people affected 
by the April 2016 floods. Five of the seven people that died as a result of the disaster were 
from Masasa ward. Masasa also accounted for the largest proportion of households to be 
resettled. According to city records, both sites are divided into east and west, with the former 
having a population of 18,400, while the later has 17,984. Both sites are informal settlements 
and are particularly prone to floods and mudslides. As informal settlements, both are 
characterised by high population densities, exposure to multiple hazards, poor road networks, 
poor drainage systems, high levels of poverty, absence of solid waste collection services and 
limited access to potable water and electricity. The study also discusses a slum upgrading 
project implemented in Salisburyline, another informal settlement that was also affected by 
the 2016 floods. 
 Figure 2 Location of Mzuzu city and study sites in Malawi 
 
2.2 Methodology  
This study uses a mixed methods design, combining qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. Primary data were collected through focus groups, semi-structured interviews, 
participant observation, document analysis and use of secondary datasets from the third 
integrated household survey (IHS3). Four focus groups were conducted in two informal 
settlements in Mzuzu city - Masasa and Mchengautuwa – with displaced people. Each focus 
group had between eight and 11 participants with a mixture of men and women and lasted 
about one and half hours. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
informants who included three local leaders and three disaster management committee 
members from Masasa and Mchengautwa, six Mzuzu city council officials, 20 officers from 
central government, 11 from local government, 19 from local and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), seven from development partners and six from 
academia.  
Most of the data collection was conducted between May and August 2016. Respondents 
were purposively selected: at local level these were those who were directly affected by the 
floods. City officials and other key informants at city and national level were those with 
disaster risk reduction or closely related responsibilities. The interviews and focus groups 
focused on experiences with flood disasters; vulnerability and factors increasing vulnerability 
of the population; current disaster risk reduction policies and practices; key actors and their 
role in building disaster resilience, and challenges in risk reduction efforts. On resettlement, 
questions dwelt on the planning process, challenges being experienced, expectations and 
perceptions of communities on resettlement.  
Information was also gathered through participation in meetings and field activities 
related to disaster risk reduction and response. Physical observation of the settlement 
patterns, livelihood practices and risk factors within informal settlements was also done in 
Mzuzu city through transect walks. During the transect walks, informal interviews with some 
of the community members encountered were also conducted. The study also used survey 
data accessed from the National Statistical Office (NSO) from the third integrated household 
survey, conducted between 2010 and 2011 across the country. The IHS is a national survey 
that is conducted every five years across Malawi to assess key aspects of household welfare. 
The survey focused on key areas of poverty and income, household enterprise, assets and 
consumption, agriculture, food security, stresses and shocks, housing and environment, 
education, health and other household socio-economic activities. It used a stratified two-stage 
sampling technique, where the first stage involved selection of enumeration areas using 
probability proportionate to size for each district. In the second stage, the list of households in 
each selected enumeration area was used as the sample frame, from which respondents were 
selected using systematic random sampling. The IHS3 interviewed 384 households in Mzuzu 
city (NSO, 2012).  
A number of national and city policy, regulatory and operational frameworks were also 
reviewed. The documents selected were those that had direct relevance to the research 
questions and included the national policies on disaster risk management and climate change, 
Mzuzu city’s urban plan and its draft disaster risk management plan, draft national urban 
policy, national disaster profile, project reports from NGOs, minutes of meetings and reports 
related to the flood disaster and resettlement. The Department of Climate Change and 
Meteorological Services provided the rainfall data used in the study. 
Quantitative data were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics 23 and MS Excel to produce 
descriptive statistics and graphs. Transcribed qualitative data from focus groups and 
interviews were merged with field notes and analysed using thematic and constant 
comparison analysis (Charmaz, 2003; Braun and Clarke, 2005; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009; 
Bryman, 2016). The use of multiple categories of research participants to look at the same or 
very similar issues necessitated these analysis approaches for qualitative data. 
 
3.0 Results  
3.1 Hazards and vulnerability 
During interviews and focus groups in Masasa, Mchengautuwa and with other key 
informants, floods, drought, mudslides, environmental degradation and disease outbreaks 
were cited as the major hazards faced by people in the city. The survey data shows that high 
food prices, high cost of agriculture inputs and illness of a household member are the most 
predominant shocks in the communities (fig. 3). While floods and drought may not be 
considered as common shocks that communities experience from the IHS3 data, most of the 
challenges cited during the survey, such as high food prices, are often linked to drought and 
floods in the Malawi context.  
 
Figure 3: Common shocks experienced in the last 12 months in Mzuzu according to the IHS3 
Two closely related vulnerability factors commonly cited by key informants and focus 
group participants were poverty and the settlements occupied. The majority of the population 
in Mzuzu are migrants who live in 12 informal settlements spread across the city. City 
officials said they consider informal settlements illegal and provision of social services is 
limited. The survey data shows that 56.9 percent of the population in Mzuzu city live in 
permanent houses, 21.6 percent in semi-permanent and 21.6 percent in traditional housing 
units
1
. Most of the semi-permanent and permanent houses are located in informal settlements. 
The survey data also shows that 50 percent of the population live in rented houses, while 43 
percent live in houses they own. Physical observations during transect walks in Masasa and 
Mchengautuwa revealed several ‘unsafe conditions’ in construction practices, with several 
houses of poor quality, overcrowded and haphazardly located in high risk areas such as on 
hill sides prone to mudslides and on the edges of rivers and swamps.  
Most of those who occupy informal settlements come from rural areas (fig. 4). 
Economic factors drive most of the migrants into the city, with the top three reasons for 
migrating being: looking for work (24.2 percent), starting new job or business (23.2 percent) 
and returning from work elsewhere (19.8 percent). Asked why they settle in such high risk 
areas, most claimed they cannot afford planned low-density locations, where land or rent 
costs are exorbitant. Some choose to live in denial and underplay the threat of disasters, 
feeling safe where they are. In the words of one community leader in Mchengautuwa: 
Every day we wake up we see the city, and we have been close to it all our lives. We 
face minor disasters every year but survive. Our houses were affected this year 
because the rains fell continuously for two weeks, which has not happened before. 
We are safe where we are.  
 
                                                          
1
 Permanent structure: A permanent structure is one having a roof made of iron sheets, tiles, concrete or asbestos, and walls 
made of burnt bricks, concrete or stones. Semi-permanent structure: Semi-permanent is the term used here for a mix of 
permanent and traditional building materials. Traditional structure: Traditional structures are those made from traditional 
housing construction materials. These materials are taken from common natural resources – unfired mud brick, grass 
thatching for roofs, rough poles for roof beams (NSO, 2010). 
 Figure 4: Origin of Mzuzu city residents as per the IHS3 data 
Several key informants mentioned deficiencies in planning and enforcement of the 
city’s regulations as root causes of flood disasters. Although some bye-laws on how land can 
be used and disposed of are in place, these, apart from being outdated, are rarely enforced. 
Building inspectors are present in the city but city officials cited inadequate numbers and 
limited resources as main reasons for failing to regulate settlements and construction in the 
city. Several key informants felt the city council is to blame for the large numbers of informal 
settlements. In the words of one city official: 
I believe the city had little control over the people in the beginning and people were 
free to choose where to live without considering what might happen to them in the 
future. Had it been the city was in full control at the beginning, we would not be 
talking of these things at this point in time. 
However, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for the city argued the council is not to blame 
for the proliferation of informal settlements and pushed the blame to local leaders and 
democracy: 
The city never allowed people to settle in risky areas. However, change of political 
dimension from single party to multiparty democracy led to free-for-all land 
sharing in the cities of Malawi, including Mzuzu. Another factor is the continued 
existence of traditional leaders who are still allocating land in the city 
 Conflicts over land with local leaders within the city and also from the neighbouring 
districts are common, where most of the land is customary. Customary land is controlled by 
local leaders, which poses challenges to the city. The city has a committee in place that is 
responsible for land allocation and regulating developments. However, conflicts are common 
between the committee and local leaders in the allocation and utilisation of the land. City 
officials claimed there have been several cases where local leaders have sold land that 
belongs to the city. In extreme cases, these conflicts have culminated in destruction of 
structures constructed by the city in places local leaders argue are theirs. Several key 
informants cited the city’s location between two districts as contributing to these conflicts 
and also hampering its efforts to reduce disaster risks. 
Another vulnerability factor to floods stems from uncollected household, market and 
other solid waste which block the already inadequate drainage channels. In some cases, waste 
is dumped in rivers and streams within the settlements, thereby affecting the flow of water in 
times of rains and leading to floods. During transect walks in Masasa and Mchengautuwa, 
solid waste could be seen dumped in drainages, close to homes and markets and in rivers and 
streams. In addition, the survey data shows that 90 percent of the population in the city rely 
on forest solid products (firewood and charcoal) as fuel for cooking, with only 9.9 percent 
using electricity. Key informants cited this over-reliance on forest products to have largely 
contributed to the deforestation of Kaning’ina, the largest forest in the city. This, in turn, has 
led to siltation of rivers and eventual flooding during rainy seasons.  
 
3.2 Disaster risk reduction efforts and challenges 
 City officials and other key informants mentioned a number of policy and practical 
challenges affecting disaster risk reduction efforts. While the city recognises that it is exposed 
to multiple hazards, efforts to reduce disaster risks are limited. The mayor for the city stated 
that challenges in reducing disaster risks range from inadequate financial resources to 
institutional challenges. He acknowledged that in view of climate change and frequent 
occurrence of disasters, the city has to change its mind-set and start mainstreaming climate 
change and disaster risk reduction in its plans. In the words of the head of one NGO: 
Major threats include conceptual challenges as disasters have often been response 
driven – so DRR requires considerable changes in thinking; and financial 
challenges - allocating scarce resources from development budgets for the 
realization of DRR can be quite a challenge, given the many competing demands 
we have. 
 
The city does not have any disaster risk management or adaptation plan or strategy. A 
disaster risk management plan drafted in 2014 was still not finalised by early 2017. 
Focus group participants and key informants highlighted the lack of support from 
central government and NGOs to urban areas in disaster risk reduction or adaptation. This, as 
argued by a city official, makes the urban poor face the consequences of shocks and stresses 
on their own. The survey data shows that most households (46 percent) rely on own savings 
to respond to the shocks they face, while 11 percent get support from relatives and friends. 
Up to 38 percent do nothing when shocks strike, while only one percent get help from 
government. In Malawi, the urban poor are often not included in safety nets and 
government’s food insecurity response programmes on the presumption that urban areas are 
‘better off’. The methodology used by the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 
which conducts annual assessment of food insecurity to identify households that would 
require food aid, does not include urban areas.  
Concentration on rural areas by central government and other players also means that 
urban managers are ill-prepared for disaster risk management not just in terms of technical 
capacity but also in coordination structures at different scales. Mzuzu city does not have any 
officer employed for disaster risk management purposes. Instead, an officer who is a public 
health worker acts as a desk officer. The city level disaster risk management committee has 
been dormant and only became active when the 2016 floods struck. Below the city level, such 
committees do not exist. In both Masasa and Mchengautuwa, committees that had been set up 
to coordinate camps at the time of the floods were still active post-displacement. The national 
tools used for disaster assessment are also skewed towards rural areas. City officials and 
NGOs indicated that they had challenges to adapt the tools to the urban context during the 
2016 floods and ended up not capturing some indicators. Responding to a question on why 
urban areas have been ignored, a senior government officer from the Department of Disaster 
Management Affairs (DoDMA) said: 
Urban areas had been neglected for a long time because the view, based on 
disaster trends, had been that disasters occur in rural areas… Lately, we have seen 
an increased occurrence of disasters such as floods in urban areas. It is because of 
this trend that DoDMA has started focusing on building capacity of urban councils 
in DRM. There is need for urban councils to acquire knowledge in disaster 
prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response as well as recovery. There is also 
need to establish DRM structures in the urban areas so that they can assist in the 
coordination of DRM activities. 
But what risk reduction efforts are underway in the city? The city’s CEO and mayor 
cited rehabilitation of drainage systems, fund-raising campaigns towards disaster risk 
reduction activities, reforestation and plans to relocate some households from high risk areas 
as some of the activities the city is undertaking to reduce disaster risks. In reaction to the 
2016 floods, central government officials and NGOs also indicated they plan to implement 
several DRR activities in the city. These include establishing local DRM committees in the 
wards, recruitment of full time DRM officer, training of city officials in DRM and finalising 
the city’s DRM plan. 
There are other alternative pathways to resilience building being explored in other 
informal settlements within the city by non-state actors from a developmental perspective. 
These are being done without government’s financial support. For instance, the United 
Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT) partnered with a local NGO and 
other players to implement a pilot participatory slum upgrading project in Salisburyline, one 
of the informal settlements. Salisburyline was one of the most affected settlements by the 
2016 floods. It is located on the lower part of the city, where most of the drainage systems 
and natural gullies from upper areas drain into. As an informal settlement, the city does not 
offer waste collection services. The pilot project, therefore, aimed at addressing these 
challenges. It has already improved the drainage system, in addition to providing other social 
amenities. For instance, communities have formed groups that collect waste from households 
and markets and convert them into composite manure, which they also sell. This has 
enhanced income generation and agricultural production, improved the sanitation and 
drainage systems in the area and reduced flood risk. It was observed during transect walks in 
Salisburyline that it had a more organised solid waste disposal arrangement, with littering 
controlled as compared to Masasa and Mchengautuwa. 
 
3.3 Reducing disaster risks through voluntary resettlement 
As one way of reducing flood disaster risks, a voluntary resettlement programme is being 
implemented by the city council. Though considered as a long-term preventive measure, the 
2016 floods appear to be the major driving force behind the city’s decision. The city has 
identified the most at risk household from those displaced by the floods. Each of the selected 
household is being offered a plot of land and the household would have to find its own means 
of constructing houses at the new site. 
There are a number of issues that the city council and communities are grappling with 
in the planning and execution of the resettlement programme. One of the most prominent 
challenges is that the city does not ‘own’ any idle land, yet those that are to resettle expect the 
city to provide them with land. When the city wants land for development, it applies to the 
Department of Lands. The city has negotiated with the Department of Lands and has been 
allocated land for the resettlement of about 1000 households. Communities and other key 
informants consider the figure to be inadequate compared to those that should be resettled.  
Another issue concerns renters, who are estimated to account for around 50% of the 
displaced. City officials indicated that renters are not going to benefit from the resettlement 
programme. They argue that renters do not own the land or houses they occupy and have the 
option of finding houses to rent elsewhere. Some of the renters informally interviewed felt 
sidelined by government and argued that they had taken the risk to rent houses in disaster-
prone areas because they had no other alternatives. It was observed during data collection that 
most renters occupied dilapidated houses.  
Using a flood displaced household as the unit in determining who to resettle is 
bringing other complexities. Some landlords own and let out more than one house. In some 
instances, the landlord does not stay in the same community or city. The size of plot is also 
not uniform. The city argues there could also be a group of people that own several houses 
but only one or two were affected. With the city’s plan to only allocate one plot per 
household, some landlords expressed reluctance to move. On the other hand, the city also 
fears that such landlords may accept a new plot in the new location but continue 
reconstruction in the old area. In addition, not all houses were affected, or equally affected by 
the floods. The city indicates that it is not implementing a wholesale resettlement programme 
and those whose houses were affected but their land ‘looks good’ are being advised to 
reconstruct in the same location. 
 Discussions with community members and city officials revealed that two camps have 
emerged among the population, with some willing and others not interested in resettling. 
Paradoxically, city officials claimed they are receiving death threats from both camps. Those 
with established assets and businesses appear more unwilling to move. Most of the affected 
households are involved in informal small-scale businesses and they trade within or close to 
their communities. The household survey shows that 29 percent of the households in the city 
own some form of non-agriculture business enterprise, with the majority of the businesses (95 
percent) selling produce directly to consumers. 43 percent of these are trading in the local 
market places while 28 percent do their businesses within their homestead. Resettling away 
would mean that they re-establish their enterprises in new markets, which most claimed is a 
challenge. In the words of a small-scale businessman interviewed during transect walks: “I do 
my business mostly with people I know or from within my area. If I move away, it will take 
time to find customers and I will suffer.”  
To demonstrate their unwillingness to move, some of those targeted for resettlement 
were observed reconstructing in the same risky areas, using the same designs and without 
regard to building back better or safer. Some house owners, with no technical skills in 
construction, were observed working on their houses. One house owner interviewed in 
Masasa said: 
We have been staying in camps and now that am back home, what I need most is a 
roof over my head and that of my family. I don’t have money to pay anyone to build 
for me. I can also not wait for government as they take long to assist or will never 
come at all. 
Those calling for speedy allocation of land are accusing the city of holding ulterior 
motives, arguing city officials want to allocate the land to themselves or their friends. Other 
city officials suspect that some rich people and other elites are instigating the people to 
demand more land so that they can later buy it. A number of what communities consider 
deserving households have been left out, while some people have irregularly been allocated 
more than one plot. Participation of the displaced community in the resettlement planning 
was very limited, with city officials undertaking the whole process and only coming to the 
communities during registration. A local councillor from Masasa was quoted in the media, 
claiming:  
People are surprised that the council secretariat conducted registration but did not 
involve anybody including block leaders from the area. Therefore, they suspect 
some officials from the council plan to sell the other plots which are in the name of 
one person (Kalimira, 2017). 
This has forced some people to reject the whole resettlement process. City officials feel the 
community’s lack of resources to construct houses on their own is the reason for their 
unwillingness to relocate. Some participants also echoed these sentiments, arguing that since 
the city is not constructing houses for them or offering any form of compensation, they may 
end up destitute when they move.  
 
4.0 Discussion 
4.1 Resettle or not resettle?  
For most developing countries, structural disaster mitigation measures may remain out of 
reach. Where protective options are limited, resettlement of population from high risk areas 
could be the most convenient option. Resettlement can be an effective way of preventing 
future disasters as it can entirely eliminate the likelihood of a disaster. However, as other 
studies have shown, when implemented arbitrarily, it can create more serious threats whose 
consequences could be more severe than the disasters being prevented (Oliver-Smith, 1991; 
Cernea, 1997, 2000; Carmona and Correa, 2011). The Mzuzu resettlement process lacks core 
ingredients of a successful resettlement scheme demonstrated by several studies (Correa et 
al., 2011; Arnall, 2013; Artur and Hilhorst, 2014; Vlaeminck et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017; 
Keraminiyage & Piyatadsananon, 2013; Usamah & Hyaden, 2012). For instance, by just 
focusing on provision of land with no other form of support, it raises questions not just about 
livelihood impacts but increases the likelihood that those with no resources to reconstruct 
would end up selling the land and get cheaper places in the same risky areas.  
Since evidence from the integrated household survey shows that city residents rely more 
on social networks than on government, the selective resettlement arrangements may further 
increase levels of vulnerability. Cernea (1997, 2000) cautions planners to desist from 
implementing resettlement schemes that would lead to community disarticulation. Breaking 
down of social networks that are key to resilience will affect the overall resilience of the 
communities. Selective resettlement may also attract others to come and occupy the land that 
has been abandoned. For a city known for failing to enforce its laws and regulations, this 
likelihood remains high. Ignoring renters who may be equally or more vulnerable also seems 
retrogressive. Elsewhere, renters have been identified as among the most powerless and 
invisible informal settlement dwellers: they lack capacity to organise themselves and take 
collective action and are also most likely not to take adaptive action against climate shocks 
and stresses (Davis, 2006; Isunju et al., 2016).  
As other scholars have argued (Carmona and Correa, 2011; Arnall, 2013; Ferris, 2015; 
Chen et al., 2017; Mavhura et al., 2017) and like any other risk reduction measures, 
resettlement should not be considered as a standalone intervention that does not speak to 
other risk management and development strategies of a country or an area such as housing, 
roads, markets and utilities. For others, the need for income sustainability is often more 
important than that of physical protection from hazards (Tadgell et al., 2017). The reluctance 
to move by those running small-scale businesses attest to this. As shown by the study, some 
of the shocks households experience in the city are linked to income earning capacity and 
ability to access food. In the end, resettlement should not just be seen as a process that has 
moved people out of risky areas but should also be judged by how it has sustainably restored 
people’s lives and livelihoods. Achieving this requires full participation of the whole 
community in planning and decision making. Decisions about where to resettle, when to 
resettle, how to resettle and what resources and opportunities would be available to those 
resettling for them to reconfigure their lives and livelihoods cannot just be left in the hands of 
authorities. Failing to involve the community can also stimulate distrust and give room to 
accusations of corrupt practices as is being claimed by community members in the city. 
 
4.2 Are there alternatives? 
While attractive, resettlement will minimally address the risks that Mzuzu city residents 
face. It could offer immediate and temporary mechanical fixes to floods for a few households. 
Vulnerability to disasters is often about the elements that individuals and societies have, such 
as houses, farms, levels of education, gender, age, poverty, natural resources and livelihoods 
(Wisner et al., 2004; Adger, 2006; Arnall, 2015). This paper has presented some of the key 
drivers of vulnerability to floods in the city. These include unsafe construction practices, poor 
drainage systems, unregulated solid waste disposal, institutional incapacity, inadequacy of 
land, settlements in high risk areas, deforestation, siltation of rivers and national disaster risk 
reduction policies that neglect urban areas. Not only is the emphasis on resettlement failing to 
address these underlying drivers of vulnerability, but it is also obscuring them. Resettlement 
is also creating new forms of vulnerability for those being resettled and those left behind. 
Moreover, with 60% of Mzuzu’s population living in informal settlements, the resettlement 
programme would cover only around 4%. 
The fourth priority area in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-
2030, emphasises on building back better in post-disaster recovery (UN-ISDR, 2015). While 
it is recommended to encourage communities in high risk areas to construct better houses or 
build back better after a disaster, this study has shown that it may be quixotic for most of the 
urban poor. Most people in informal settlements are migrants from rural villages who simply 
do not have the means to afford better housing on their own. Previous studies have also 
shown that during recovery phase, residents will often not wait for city plans to start the 
reconstruction phase and will reconstruct basing on their capabilities, without regard to 
resilience (Oliver-smith and Goldman, 1988; Wamsler, 2004; Miles et al., 2012). The 
evidence from Mzuzu also confirms the observation by Wamsler (2004) that those 
reconstructing after a disaster sometimes build in the same risky areas. Where the 
reconstruction process is not guided by risk assessments or technical support, it is likely to 
not just reproduce the old risks but also create additional risks. In the event that a decision has 
been made to reconstruct in the same area after a disaster, appropriate technical and financial 
support should be provided to those who need to reconstruct in order to build back better and 
safer.  
Development of legislation, building codes and urban plans that integrate disaster risk 
reduction is another important step in tackling the underlying causes of vulnerability. 
Addressing the causes of vulnerability requires a developmental approach (Wisner et. al., 
2004; Manyena, 2012; Islam, 2015; Oliver-Smith, 2016), hence the need to mainstream DRR 
across all sectors within the city. Among others, this would ensure proper settlement patterns 
and construction practices. However, even if relevant legislation and policies that have 
integrated DRR are in place, it would not automatically translate into resilient cities without 
being implemented or enforced. The institutional capacity of the city itself to manage risks 
but also enforce laws and regulations needs to be strengthened. This requires substantial 
investment in human capacity and other core areas. Particularly, presence of full time 
personnel with disaster risk reduction or climate adaptation responsibilities is an important 
step. 
While prohibiting settlement in risky areas may be another alternative (Tipple, 2006), 
this should be a priority in high risk areas that have not yet been occupied. In the case of 
Mzuzu, where the majority of its citizenry already occupy hazardous places, proper planning 
and improvements should be made in situ to reduce disaster risks. This ‘living with floods’ 
approach has been widely promoted by UN agencies such as UN-HABITAT, NGOs and 
other donors in Malawi. Arnall (2015) also reported on the same in the case of Mozambique. 
Slum upgrading programmes like the one implemented by UN-HABITAT in the city are 
encouraging developments. The advantage with slum improvement programmes is that they 
also factor in social aspects aimed at community development (Baker, 2012). Such initiatives 
should also aim at promoting locally-appropriate and resilient house construction practices in 
areas exposed to hazards. However, programmes of this nature require strong political and 
institutional commitment as well as active community participation. Evidence on the ground 
in Malawi indicates that financial support for such initiatives from government has not been 
forthcoming.  
As was observed in some locations in the city, sometimes residents tend to 
underestimate or deny their levels of vulnerability to disasters. Without any disaster 
occurring, they can remain ignorant of the risks they are exposed to or choose to live in 
denial. Public awareness programmes on disaster risk reduction among city dwellers should 
also be prioritised.  
 
5.0 Conclusion 
This paper has raised a number of questions that urban areas should consider as they 
undertake risk reduction programmes. In the case of resettlement, these range from land 
shortfalls to decisions on who should actually be resettled, when and how. These questions 
are key to understanding resettlement complexities in urban areas in developing countries and 
could assist in designing better resettlement programmes. The paper has called for caution 
when considering risk reduction options, and has argued that resettlement should remain a 
measure of the last resort. Forcing or enticing people to resettle when the core system is 
disorganised does not appear to be the best way of reducing disaster risks. Indeed, cases 
where resettlement has failed are more common than where it has succeeded. The Mzuzu 
case may just end up as another addition to the catalogue of resettlement failures. Within a 
system that has a tendency to take no action when people disregard its policies and laws, 
there is no guarantee that those being resettled would not return, or that the land left behind 
would not be reoccupied, or that the allocated land would not be sold.  
In the face of poverty and other social ills in most developing countries, urban areas will 
continue offering pull factors for rural households. As this paper and other previous studies 
have demonstrated, most of these rural migrants end up occupying the most delicate spaces. 
Countries will have to make tough policy choices if the risks are to be brought to manageable 
levels. Allowing people to stay in unsafe informal settlements without any protection cannot 
be considered a logical decision. By their nature, some environments such as wetlands are 
supposed to be protected as they also act as natural flood controls. With the likelihood of 
increasing urban risk in the face of climate change and climate variability and rapid 
population growth, compounded by tough economic conditions, low-income countries may 
need to invest more in integrating disaster resilience in the normal urban planning and 
development processes. As the PAR model shows, the focus should be on addressing the 
physical, social, economic, political and human conditions that are at the centre of 
vulnerability to floods and other disasters.  
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